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THERE AND BACK AGAIN? POLICE REFORMS THROUGH
THE PRISM OF THE RECRUITMENT DECISIONS IN THE
HIGH COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEAL

FESTUS M. KINOTI*
INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND: POLICE REFORMS IN KENYA
II. RECRUITMENT AS A KEY PILLAR OF POLICE REFORMS IN KENYA
III. THE RECRUITMENT CASE BEFORE THE COURTS
A. Before the High Court
1. Transparency, Accountability, and Public
Participation
2. Whether There was Discrimination Against Women
in the Recruitment Exercise
3. Delegation of Constitutional Powers
B. The Case Before the Court of Appeal
C. The Court’s Determination
D. Analysis of the Court’s Determination
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE RECRUITMENT DECISIONS ON REFORMS IN
RECRUITMENT OF POLICE OFFICERS
A. Transparency and Accountability in the Recruitment
Process
B. Discrimination Against Women on Account of Pregnancy
C. Delegation of Constitutional Powers
V. POLICE RECRUITMENT EXERCISES IN 2015, 2016, AND 2017:
A CASE OF THERE AND BACK AGAIN
A. Recruitment Exercise in 2015
B. Subsequent Recruitment Exercises in 2016 and 2017
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 2014, the National Police Service Commission,
[hereinafter NPSC or the Commission] in exercise of its powers
under Article 246 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, put out an
advertisement in the local dailies seeking to recruit 10,000 suitable
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and qualified candidates as police constables.1 The recruitment
exercise was to be carried out nationwide in all 294 recruitment
centres on July 14, 2014.2 This was to be the largest National Police
Service recruitment exercise in the country’s history.3 After the exercise, a plethora of complaints arose regarding the manner in which
the exercise was carried out.4 In particular, allegations of massive
corruption were made against the sub-county recruitment committees, which were entities set up by the Commission at sub-county
levels to conduct the recruitment exercise at the centres.5
Following receipt of these complaints and on the basis of its own
observations from monitoring the exercise, the Independent Policing
Oversight Authority (IPOA), a state agency established under the
Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act of 20116 with an
oversight mandate over the National Police Service,7 recommended
the Commission cancel the entire exercise and conduct fresh recruitment.8 The Commission declined to repeat the exercise and instead
formed a multi-agency working committee to investigate the claims.9
The working committee released its report in which it recommended
nullification of the exercise in only thirty-six of the 294 centres.10
Dissatisfied with the position adopted by the Commission, IPOA
filed a petition before the High Court seeking, inter alia, nullification of the entire recruitment exercise.11
1. See Cyrus Ombati, National Police Service Commission to recruit 10,000 police
officers, STANDARD (June 30, 2014), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000126487
/national-police-service-commission-to-recruit-10-000-police-off icers?articleID=20001
26487&story_title=national-police-service-commission-to-recruit-10-000-police-off icers
&pageNo=1 [ https://perma.cc/PG4W-H8CW]; C ONSTITUTION art. 246 (2010) (Kenya).
2. Statement By The National Police Service Commission On The Audit Of The
Police Constables Recruitment Exercise Held On 14th July 2014, R EPUBLIC OF K ENYA
N AT’L P OLICE S ERV. C OMM’N (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.npsc.go.ke/index.php/latest
-news-/135-statement-by-the-national-police-service-commission-on-the-audit-of-the-police
-constables-recruitment-exercise-held-on-14th-July-2014 [ https://perma.cc/AU69-5BD2]
[ hereinafter Statement by the NPSC].
3. Thousands turn up to join police service, D AILY N ATION (July 14, 2014), http://
www.nation.co.ke/news/Thousands-turn-up-to-join-police-service/1056-2383266-6rnf5z
/index.html [ https://perma.cc/S728-H8YX].
4. See Statement by the NPSC, supra note 2.
5. See id.
6. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (2011) Cap. 88 § 3(1) (Kenya).
7. Id. § 5.
8. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 3
(H.C.K.) (Kenya), http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/103031 [ https://perma.cc
/6J63-SVB8].
9. Joint Statement On The Police Recruitment Exercise, N AT’L P OLICE S ERV.
COMM’N, http://www.npsc.go.ke/index.php/latest-news/132-joint-statement-on-the-police
-recruitment-exercise [ https://perma.cc/AE7V-ELP2].
10. See Statement by the NPSC, supra note 2.
11. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 6
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
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On October 31, 2014, the High Court delivered its decision in
which it nullified the entire recruitment exercise.12 The court then
directed that a fresh recruitment exercise be conducted in tandem
with the provisions of the Constitution and the National Police
Service Commission Act.13 Dissatisfied with the judgment of the
High Court, the Commission lodged an appeal before the Court of
Appeal.14 However, before the Court rendered its decision, following
pressure from the executive, the Commission conducted another
recruitment exercise on April 20, 2015.15
The Court of Appeal, on May 8, 2015, rendered its judgement
on the 2014 recruitment exercise in which it upheld the High Court
decision and dismissed the appeal.16
The case before the High Court and the Court of Appeal raised
important legal issues that impact police reforms in Kenya, in particular, the High Court considered issues regarding transparency,
accountability, public participation, and discrimination of women in
the recruitment of police officers.17 Both the High Court and Court
of Appeal considered the question of delegation of constitutional
powers and whether recruitment powers constitutionally reposed
upon the Commission could be delegated to other entities.18
This Article analyzes the courts’ determinations on these key
legal issues that were canvassed before both the High Court and the
Court of Appeal. In light of that analysis, this Article interrogates
how the courts’ determinations impact police reforms in Kenya, in
particular with regard to recruitment of police officers.
The first part of the article, therefore, briefly looks at police
reforms in Kenya, focusing on the recruitment of police officers as
a key pillar of police reforms and the rationale behind reforms to the
recruitment process.
The second part of the article looks at the recruitment case before the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The paper focuses on key
legal issues that came up before the courts, impacting police reforms,
transparency, accountability, public participation, discrimination,
12. See id. at para.128( b).
13. Id. at para. 128(f).
14. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/109146/ [ https://perma.cc/VD8T-EL8A].
15. See Kenya Police recruitment kicks off countrywide, S TANDARD D AILY (Apr. 21,
2015), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000159179/kenya-police-recruitment
-kicks-off-countrywide [ https://perma.cc/2W4Q-P9X6].
16. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
17. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 47
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
18. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya);
Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 47 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
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and delegation of constitutional powers, and how the courts analyzed and dealt with these issues.
The third part considers how the courts’ determinations have
impacted police reforms with regard to recruitment, especially in
view of the subsequent recruitment exercises carried out in 2015,
2016, and 2017.
The last part of the paper concludes by investigating whether
the intended entrenchment of the reforms in the recruitment of members of the police service was achieved through the petition or if it
was a case of there and then back again.
I. BACKGROUND: POLICE REFORMS IN KENYA
The Kenyan police, similar to other institutions created during
the colonial period, drew its character and modus operandi from the
dictates of colonialism.19 The Kenyan police especially was a force
designed to aid the colonial administration in crushing civilian resistance to British colonial rule.20 For instance, the use of the police
in the torture and extrajudicial killings of persons perceived to be
Mau Mau and their sympathizers is now well documented in the
Pulitzer prize-winning book by Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag.21
The police were therefore perceived as an appendage of British
oppression in Kenya.22
The relationship between the Kenyan public and the police,
however, did not markedly change post-independence.23 The successive post-independence governments, instead of engaging in the
arduous task of nation-building in a state comprised of multiethnic,
multireligious societies, welded together into a state only through
an oppressive colonial project; they found it easier to use the police
in doing the executive’s bidding in a bid to aggrandize and collate
power.24 The use of the police in extrajudicial killings, torture, and
other acts of gratuitous violence thus continued to be associated
with the police even post-independence.25 Additionally, similar to
any other institution that operates in opacity, corruption also started
gnawing at the heart of the police.26 Soon corruption became the
19. See P HILLIP R ANSLEY, R EPORT OF THE N ATIONAL T ASK F ORCE ON P OLICE R EFORMS
13 (2009) [ hereinafter R ANSLEY R EPORT].
20. See id. at 14.
21. See C AROLINE E LKINS, IMPERIAL R ECKONING: T HE U NTOLD STORY OF B RITAIN’S
G ULAG IN K ENYA 312–14 (2005).
22. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 182.
23. See id. at 15.
24. See id. at 15–16.
25. See id. at 88.
26. See id. at 98.
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hallmark of the police, with the police force being consistently ranked
as the most corrupt institution in Kenya.27 The police force was thus
in dire need of reforms.
K.R. Hope, Sr. notes that global “demands for police reforms and
accountability are . . . made as a result of crisis of confidence in the police.” 28 Kenya’s 2007–2008 post-election violence was an event that
shattered any remnants of public confidence in the police, and the
conclusions by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence [hereinafter referred to as the Waki Commission] on police conduct during the violence were damning.29 The Waki Commission found
that the police had not only fantastically failed to adequately protect
Kenyans, but had themselves been involved in the commission of egregious crimes during that period, including rape, murder, and theft.30
The Waki Commission further found that the policies, system, and
procedures meant to respond to complaints against the police themselves and to deal with other perpetrators of violence were outdated
and did not work, thus further exacerbating the sorry state of the
police in Kenya.31 The post-election violence was thus not only an
event in which policing in Kenya failed catastrophically, but it was
also a watershed moment that fully laid bare the rot that had been
eroding any remnants of professionalism and accountability in the
police since independence and also brought to the forefront the urgent
need for wholesale reforms in the police.32 Inclusion of police reforms
as part of the Agenda Four items in the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement between parties that ended the post-election
violence was, therefore, no surprise.33 The subsequent appointment
of the National Task Force on Police Reforms (NTFPR or Ransley
Task Force) was the beginning of a badly needed wholesale police
reform process.34 The report that emanated from the task force,
27. See, e.g., T RANSPARENCY INT’L—K ENYA, C ORRUPTION IN K ENYA: F INDINGS OF AN
URBAN BRIBERY SURVEY 6 (2001); TRANSPARENCY INT’L—KENYA, THE KENYA BRIBERY INDEX 9 tbl. 8 (2005); T RANSPARENCY I NT’L—K ENYA, C ORRUPTION IN K ENYA: F INDINGS OF
AN U RBAN B RIBERY S URVEY 9 (2006); T RANSPARENCY INT’L—K ENYA, T HE K ENYA B RIBERY
INDEX 12 tbl. 8 (2007); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, THE EAST AFRICAN BRIBERY INDEX 15 (2011).
28. Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., In pursuit of democratic policing: An analytical review
and assessment of police reforms in Kenya, 17 INT’L J. P OLICE S CI. & M GMT. 91, 96 (2015).
29. See P HILIP N. W AKI, R EPORT OF THE C OMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE P OST E LECTION
V IOLENCE 416–27 (2008), http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of
_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.pdf [ https://perma.cc/ZZW6-MRKC] [ hereinafter
W AKI R EPORT].
30. See id. at 421.
31. See id. at 424.
32. See id. at ix.
33. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 1–3.
34. See id. at 3.
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commonly known as the Ransley Report, provided the blueprint for
police reforms in Kenya.35 These reforms would entail structural and
legal reforms, as well as policy shifts, to transform what was a force
beholden to the executive into a police service beholden to democratic policing ideals.36
II. RECRUITMENT AS A KEY PILLAR OF POLICE REFORMS IN KENYA
The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) and the
Commission were both born out of these structural and legal reforms.37 IPOA was created out of a necessity to have civilian oversight over police conduct.38 The police had previously been remiss to
investigate cases of misconduct by fellow police officers, and the
issue finally came to the fore during the post-election violence.39
Many victims of alleged rape and other forms of sexual and genderbased violence and extrajudicial killings by the police were simply
turned away from police stations with the police reluctant to investigate the alleged cases of massive criminal conduct by fellow police
officers.40 Consequently, in 2011, following recommendations in both
the Waki41 and the Ransley Reports,42 the IPOA was established via
the IPOA Act of 2011,43 and the inaugural board took office in 2012.44
IPOA was thus created to, inter alia, investigate cases of misconduct
by the police and make recommendations, including prosecution.45
The mandate of the IPOA is, however, wider than only investigative.46 It also includes giving effect to Article 244 of the Constitution,
which aims at embedding in the police service qualities such as
professionalism, discipline, transparency, and accountability.47
35. See id. at xxviii–xxix.
36. See id. at 97.
37. See R ELEASE P OLITICAL P RISONERS T RUST, Y OUR G UIDE T O: T HE N ATIONAL P OLICE
S ERVICE ACT, THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION ACT AND THE INDEPENDENT
POLICING OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY ACT (2012), http://humanrightsinitiative.org/publications
/police/CHRI%20and%20RPP%20Guide%20to%20the%20new%Kenya%20Police%20Laws
_Final.pdf [ https://perma.cc/A7X5-FKVG].
38. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (2011) Cap. 88 (Kenya).
39. See W AKI R EPORT, supra note 29, at 420.
40. See id. at 420–21.
41. See id. at 434.
42. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 246.
43. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (2011) Cap. 88 § 3(1) (Kenya).
44. See Independent Policing Oversight Authority, http://www.ipoa.go.ke [ https://
perma.cc/X263-XAAZ].
45. See The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (2011) Cap. 88 § 6(a)
(Kenya).
46. See id. § 6.
47. Id. § 5( b).
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The history of political manipulation and executive control of
the police, especially through recruitment, transfers, disciplinary
processes, and setting other conditions of service, formed the main
rationale for the establishment of the National Police Service Commission.48 The Ransley Report noted that one of the major problems
with the police force, as it then was, was that it was beholden to
political forces in power.49 The report noted that the Independence
Constitution had sought to insulate the police from political interference by creating a Police Service Commission whose members
enjoyed security of tenure and which was responsible for, inter alia,
salaries, allowances, qualifications, and other conditions of service.50
However, in 1964, the Constitution was amended, the Police Service
Commission was abolished, and the police were placed under the
Public Service Commission, thus the police became an extension of
the civil service.51 The report notes that this then was “the beginning of a culture of political manipulation and control of the Police
Force by the Executive.” 52
One of the ways in which this manipulation and control manifested was in the recruitment of police officers.53 Pursuant to Section 108 of the repealed Constitution, appointment of police officers
below the rank of Assistant Inspector of Police was vested in the
Commissioner of Police.54 The Commissioner was himself an appointee of the President and held office at the mercy of the appointing authority.55 The Commissioner, in turn, delegated recruitment
at various levels to his subordinates who were also beholden to the
executive and other powerful personalities.56 Consequently, recruitment exercises of members of the police became synonymous with
unethical practices, with tribalism, nepotism, corruption and other
malpractice being the popular bywords descriptive of these exercises;57 yet ironically, those recruited in exercises replete with unethical practices were themselves expected to be the vanguards of
the rule of law.58 The public, thus, lost confidence in the police from
the initial process of recruiting members into the force.59
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 45.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 47.
C ONSTITUTION art. 108(2)( b) (2009) (Kenya) (repealed).
See id. at art. 108(1).
See id. at art. 108(2)( b).
See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 102.
See id. at 98.
See id. at 80.

134

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 24:127

Consequently, reform of the police had to begin with the recruitment of members of the service, as the Ransley Report rightly noted,
“recruitment is the bedrock of a solid and professional police service.”60
The proposal for the establishment of the Commission thus
drew from the need to de-link the police from political influence and
to professionalize it from a force into a service that could reclaim
public confidence.61 One of the major functions of the Commission
is to carry out recruitment of members of the National Police Service.62 Recruitment powers were, therefore, to be entirely removed
from the Public Service Commission and the Commissioner of Police
and vested on the NPSC.63
The NPSC was f inally established in the Constitution of Kenya
2010, Article 246 as an independent constitutional commission.64 Its
functions include recruiting police officers, confirming appointments, promotions, transfers within the service, and exercising
disciplinary control over police officers.65 The Commission consists
of eight commissioners:
(i)

a person who is qualified to be appointed as a High Court
Judge;
(ii) two retired senior police officers; and
(iii) three persons of integrity who have served the public with
distinction;
(b) the Inspector-General of the National Police Service; and
(c) both Deputy Inspectors-General of the National Police
Service.66

On September 30, 2011, the National Police Service Commission Act was assented to and commenced on October 10, 2011.67 The
intention of the Act was to, inter alia, make further provisions for
the functions and powers of the Commission.68 However, as shall be
discussed below, the Act expands the powers of the Commission
beyond the remits of what Article 246 of the Constitution provides.69
Reforms of the recruitment process, however, were not just limited to the entity that would conduct the recruitment exercise, but
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 98.
See id. at 80.
See id. at 109.
See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 109.
C ONSTITUTION art. 246 (2010) (Kenya).
See id. § 3.
See id. § 2(a).
The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C (Kenya).
Id.
See id. §§ 10, 11.
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also the manner the exercise was to be carried out.70 The Ransley
Report noted that in Kenya the recruitment exercise had become a
one-day event characterized by nepotism, political patronage, favoritism, and bribery, thus further casting doubt on the recruiters’
abilities to verify and scrutinize the suitability of potential recruits
to join the service.71 The report concluded that there were a large
number of police officers who gained entry into the police without
requisite qualifications.72 The effect of this was police officers who
were not “professionally loyal to the police services nor patriotic to
their calling and country.” 73 Following bench marking visits to
Botswana, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the report concluded
that in countries with professional police services, the recruitment
exercise was a process aimed at getting the best to join the police
service.74 The process also enabled the recruiting agency to be able
to sufficiently vet and scrutinize those joining the service, thus
ensuring only highly qualified persons joined the police.75 Consequently, the report recommended that the recruitment exercise be
a three stage process that included written applications, oral interviews, and vetting by the Commission.76
Reform of the recruitment of police officers was, therefore, an
integral aspect of police reforms. Consequently, the question of
whether the recruitment exercise of 2014, the largest exercise in the
country’s history, met constitutional requirements in terms of who
actually carried out the exercise and the process through which the
exercise was carried out, were important questions placed before the
courts.77 Consequently, the courts’ determinations on these issues
has an impact on police reforms in Kenya.
III. THE RECRUITMENT CASE BEFORE THE COURTS
As aforesaid, the recruitment Petition Number 390 of 2014 was
lodged by IPOA following the refusal by the Commission to cancel
and repeat the entire recruitment exercise carried out in 2014.78 The
Petition sought nullification of the entire exercise and a repeat of
70. Id. §§ 10(1)(e)–(n).
71. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 101–02.
72. Id. at 102.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 103.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 109–10.
77. See discussion of court cases, infra Part III.
78. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 3 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
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the same in line with constitutional requirements.79 The Petition
was also consolidated by the court with other petitions, which were
mostly petitions by successful candidates from the thirty-six recruitment centres whose results were ultimately cancelled by the Commission.80 These petitioners sought a reversal of the Commission’s
decision urging, inter alia, denial of their rights to fair administrative action in the manner the Commission arrived at its decision.81
These petitions were therefore all heard together under the parent
Petition number 390 of 2014.82
A. Before the High Court
With regard to the process of recruitment, there were four main
issues raised before the High Court:
(1) Whether the recruitment exercise was carried out
without any guidelines and regulations
(2) Whether the alleged recruitment guidelines for police
constables were made public
(3) Whether the recruitment guidelines for the police constables were enacted without prior public participation
(4) Whether there was discrimination of women in the
recruitment exercise.83
With regard to the entity that actually conducted the exercise,
the key issue was whether the Commission acted illegally and in contravention of the Constitution in delegating its powers to sub-county
recruitment committees to conduct the recruitment exercise.84
1. Transparency, Accountability, and Public Participation
The first three issues regarding the process of recruitment were
analyzed by the court in the backdrop of constitutional requirements
set out under Articles 10, 73, 232, and 249.85 The need to overhaul the
governance structure in Kenya brought with it the need to include
79. Id. at para. 6.
80. Id. at para. 4.
81. Id. at para. 8.
82. See id. at para.9.
83. Id. at para. 47.
84. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 47 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
85. See id. at para. 13.
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principles to guide governance.86 These provisions require that the
overarching principles of transparency, accountability, and public participation bind all state organs, including the NPSC, and must permeate all their actions when making and implementing policies and
applying the Constitution.87 Consequently, conduct of the recruitment exercise was required to meet the Constitutional imperatives
of transparency, accountability, and public participation.88
Interestingly, while these principles apply generally to all actions by state organs, because of the need to ensure the reformed
police service was anchored within these Constitutional imperatives,
the drafters of the Constitution specifically included these principles
in Article 244 of the Constitution with regard to the National Police
Service.89 The legislature, then borrowing from the Constitution in
Section 12 of the NPSC Act, also provided that these principles would
specifically apply to the exercise of functions by the Commission.90
Consequently, therefore, while these principles generally apply
to all actions by state organs, they gain greater significance with
regard to the police and the Commission. These principles, therefore, now provide standards with which to gauge whether conduct
by the Commission and the National Police Service (NPS) meet the
expectations of the new constitutional dispensation.
With regard to the first issue, whether the recruitment exercise
was carried out without any guidelines and regulations, the court
noted that while enactment of regulations and guidelines was a matter
of discretion on the part of the Commission pursuant to Section 28
of the NPSC Act,91 such regulations and guidelines were an important component of transparency and accountability in any process.92
The court found that there were no gazetted regulations enacted by the Commission to govern selection of successful candidates from the many who had sought to join the service.93 The court
drew a distinction between regulations that would govern the process of selecting successful candidates after the application stage
from simply the minimum requirements set out in the advertisement put out by the Commission.94 The court noted:
86. See id. at para. 69.
87. See id. at para. 57.
88. See id.
89. See C ONSTITUTION art. 244(a)–(e) (2010) (Kenya).
90. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 12 (Kenya).
91. Id.
92. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 33
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
93. See id. at para. 65.
94. See id. at para. 64.
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The issue raised by IPOA however, as I understand it, is that the
NPSC did not have guidelines post-application stage to govern
the selection of candidates who would join the Police Service out
of the many applications made or received by it. To that end,
IPOA has raised several questions and in addition, I wish to ask
the following questions[:] what was the nature of the recruitment process after the announcement of vacancies[ ][;] [w]hat
were the requirements of shortlisting after the receipt of applications[ ][;] [h]ow was physical and medical fitness to be determined[ ][;] [w]hat factors did the NPSC take into account in that
regard[ ][; and] [h]ow would complaints arising out of the recruitment be handled[ ][.] I do not have answers to the above questions and the reason is obvious; that those answers are supposed
to be available in the recruitment guidelines and regulations.95

On the second issue, whether there were publicly available guidelines to guide the recruitment process, the court found that whatever
guidelines had been developed by the Commission were never made
publicly available.96 The court stated:
It is clear from the above deposition that the information on the
guidelines was allegedly made public through newspaper adverts
and radio announcements. I have not seen any evidence to that
effect and all I have before me are the newspaper adverts calling
for applications to join the Police Service and not the actual advertisement of the contents of the recruitment guidelines that would
abide that exercise. The onus of proof was upon NPSC to lead the
said evidence and in the absence of such evidence and based on the
material before me, I am unable to find that the NPSC actually
made the recruitment guidelines public and I so find.97

Indeed, the lack of publicly available regulations to guide the recruitment process and set objective standards by which the recruitment
exercise could be gauged wreaked havoc in the entire exercise.98 The
court observed:
In the absence of such regulations and guidelines, the evidence
before me shows that the NPSC was using a criteria known to
itself alone. That being the case, it is not surprising that the
recruitment was not uniform across the Country and was largely
left to the discretion of the Sub-County Recruitment Committees.
95. Id.
96. See id. at para. 68.
97. See id.
98. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 65 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
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At this point, I am constrained to ask myself, why could the NPSC
not wait for the enactment of the National Police Service Commission (Recruitment and Appointments) Draft Regulations, 2014 before conducting the exercise. . . . It appears to me that the NPSC
knew of the need to have regulations in place before conducting
the recruitment but nonetheless went on to conduct the recruitment without such guidelines. Those guidelines were crucial in
enhancing accountability and transparency in the manner in
which recruitment had to be conducted. Had it enacted the guidelines, perhaps this litigation would have been avoided altogether.99

The situation as described by the court is similar to the situation
prior to institution of police reforms. Since there were no publicly
available regulations setting out in detail the objective standards
with regard to which the conduct of a recruitment exercise could be
monitored by members of the public, participants in recruitment
exercises, and other stakeholders in the policing sector, the criteria
for selection of successful candidates and standards to be applied
were left at the mercy and arbitrary discretion of the persons conducting recruitment.100 This then opened avenues for corruption and
malpractice during the exercises.101
With regard to the third issue, whether the recruitment guidelines were enacted without prior public participation, while the court
concluded there were no publicly available regulations to guide the
recruitment exercise, the court noted that the Commission had
developed some guidelines (not regulations) to guide certain aspects
of the exercise.102 However, as afore stated, the court noted that
these guidelines were also never made public and were only circulated to certain government entities.103 The court was, however, also
called upon to consider whether these guidelines were developed
with public participation.104
The court began by noting that the importance of public participation in the enactment of legislation, regulations, and guidelines
as required under Article 10 of the Constitution.105 The court also,
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. For instance, requirements for recruitment into the Kenya Police Service were
set out in the Force Standing Orders (FSO) which were never made publicly available.
Further, the FSOs merely provided basic, general standards thus leaving a lot of discretion for the recruiters. For members of the Administration Police, on the other hand,
there were virtually no guidelines. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 99–101.
102. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 68
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
103. See id.
104. See id. at para. 69.
105. See id.
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referring to its previous decisions, noted the importance of public
participation in public matters in the archetype of the new governance structure.106
Although the court noted statements from the Commission were
inconclusive on whether or not there was public participation in the
development of the draft regulations, it granted the benefit of the
doubt to the Commission on the issue on the basis that the Commission was in the process of developing regulations which were at the
time in draft stage.107
It is, however, not clear from the court’s decision why the court
granted the benefit of the doubt to the Commission on the basis that
it was in the process of developing regulations which were at the
draft stage, yet what had been impugned as having been developed
without public participation, were the recruitment guidelines.108
This decision by the court, in this author’s view, was wrong, as the
court did not properly direct its mind to the question put to it when
ultimately deciding the issue.
The court unfortunately conflated the question of whether draft
recruitment regulations were developed without public participation, which was not an issue before the court (since these regulations were still in the process of development and therefore had not
been used in the recruitment exercise), with the question of whether
the recruitment guidelines (which were actually used in the recruitment exercise) were developed without public participation, which
was the proper question before the court.109 Had the court addressed
itself to the proper question, it is difficult to see how it would have
reached this conclusion having already found that the guidelines
were never made public.110
2. Whether There was Discrimination Against Women in the
Recruitment Exercise
IPOA had contended in court that the recruitment exercise had
discriminated against women in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution, which enshrines the right to equality and freedom from discrimination.111 IPOA argued that by disqualifying pregnant women
106. See id. at paras. 70–71.
107. See id. at para. 75.
108. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 69 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
109. See id. at paras. 74–75.
110. Id. at para. 68.
111. Id. at para. 76.
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from recruitment, the exercise had thus been conducted in violation
of Article 27 of the Constitution.112
Relying on the European Court of Human Rights cases of Willis
v. United Kingdom113 and Okpisz v. Germany,114 the court noted
“discrimination means treating differently without any objective
and reasonable justification, persons in relatively similar situations.” 115 Applying that standard, the court concluded that discrimination against women who were pregnant was justified by the need
to protect the lives of the pregnant women and the unborn children.116
This was because, according to the court, after recruitment, recruits
would undergo rigorous training for a period, and this, according to
the court, would imperil the lives of pregnant women and their
unborn children.117 Consequently, the court found there was no violation of Article 27 of the Constitution.118 Article 27 of the Constitution seeks to ensure equality in treatment and thus ensure the right
not to be discriminated is entrenched.119
With regard to unequal treatment in terms of gender, the
Supreme Court in the majority opinion in Advisory Opinion No. 2 of
2012120 aptly captured the raison d’etre behind the provision as it
noted:
This Court is fully cognisant [sic] of the distinct social imperfection which led to the adoption of Articles 27(8) and 81(b) of the
Constitution: that in elective or other public bodies, the participation of women has, for decades, been held at bare nominal
levels, on account of discriminatory practices, or gender-indifferent laws, policies and regulations. This presents itself as a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women in Kenyan society. . . . Thus, the Constitution sets
out to redress such aberrations, not just through affirmative
action provisions such as those in Articles 27 and 81, but also by
way of a detailed and robust Bill of Rights, as well as a set of
“national values and principles of governance” [Article 10].121

112. Id.
113. See Willis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36042/974, Eur. Ct. H.R.(2002).
114. See Okpisz v. Germany, App. No. 59140/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
115. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 81 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See C ONSTITUTION art. 27, §§ (1)–(8) (2010) (Kenya).
120. In re An Application for Advisory Opinion Under Constitution art. 163(6) (2012)
eK.L.R. (S.C.K.) (Kenya), http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/85286 [ https://
perma.cc/XT5B-XE36].
121. Id. at para. 47.
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Article 27, Section 3 provides that men and women have the
right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities
in all spheres, which includes the economic sphere.122 Article 27,
Section 4 therefore provides that the state is specifically prohibited
from discriminating against persons on enumerated grounds, including those of sex and pregnancy.123 Moreover, specifically with
regard to public service, pursuant to Article 232, Section 1(i), one of
the values and principles undergirding public service is “affording
adequate and equal opportunities for appointment, training and
advancement, at all levels of the public service, of . . . men and
women.” 124 Recruitment in the police is a means to which men and
women access employment opportunities in the public service; therefore, to bar women from recruitment on the basis of pregnancy fetters
their opportunities in the economic sphere in the public service.
Consequently, any measure that would bar women on the basis of
pregnancy from accessing employment in the police service must
meet all constitutional requirements on limitation of rights as set
out in Article 24 of the Constitution.125
Indeed, the court acknowledged that barring women who were
pregnant from the recruitment exercise was discriminatory, although,
the judge noted that the same was justified.126 The judge noted, “I
am satisfied that the discrimination meted out against women who
were pregnant into the NPSC was justifiable as argued by Mr.
Ojwang.” 127 The Constitution also envisaged that the rights secured
under Article 27 may also be limited;128 however, for a discriminatory measure to be justifiable under the Constitution, it has to
conform to requirements for justifiable limitations of rights under
Article 24 of the Constitution.129 Unfortunately, the court did not
interrogate these requirements before reaching its conclusion that
the discrimination was justified under the Constitution.130
There are two main requirements overlooked by the court that
can be drawn from the provision. Firstly, Article 24, Section 1(a)
requires any limitation of rights in the bill of rights to be provided
122. C ONSTITUTION art. 27, § 3 (2010) (Kenya).
123. Id. § 4.
124. Id. at art. 232, § 1(i).
125. Id. at art. 24.
126. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 81 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
127. Id.
128. Article 25 of the Constitution does not list rights secured in Article 27 as part of
the rights that cannot be limited. Compare CONSTITUTION art. 25, §§ (a)–(d) (2010) (Kenya)
with C ONSTITUTION art. 27 (2010) (Kenya).
129. C ONSTITUTION art. 24 (2010) (Kenya).
130. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 81 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
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for in the law.131 Currently, there is no provision either in the National Police Service Act132 or the National Police Service Commission Act133 that limits the rights of women who are pregnant from
joining the service. Consequently, the Commission could not legally
limit the rights of pregnant women from participating in the recruitment exercise, as there is no legal provision on which to anchor the
limitation.134 The failure by the court to interrogate this essential
requirement on limitation of rights was glaring bearing in mind the
court did in fact refer to Article 24 of the Constitution, though only
in passing.135 Unfortunately, the decision by the court opened the
pathway for the Commission to discriminate against women on
grounds of pregnancy in subsequent recruitment exercises without
need for a legislative predicate.136
Secondly, Article 24, Section 1(e) requires that where there is
a less restrictive means available to achieve the intended legitimate
aim, that means should be adopted instead of a limitation of the
right.137 This, therefore, places an obligation on the state to take
reasonable measures that would see to it that it does not limit the
right where the intended purpose can be achieved otherwise. This
requirement draws from International Human Rights law where
measures adopted in limitation of a right under International Human Rights Instruments must not only be in pursuit of a legitimate
purpose, but they must in addition be necessary, reasonable, and
objective (i.e., proportionate).138 It is therefore not enough that a
distinction in treatment pursues a legitimate aim, it must also be
shown that it is proportionate, i.e. suitable, necessary, and reasonable to achieve the legitimate aim.139 Consequently, where there are
other ways of achieving the intended legitimate purpose without
131. C ONSTITUTION art. 24, §§ 24(1)–(1)(a) (2010) (Kenya).
132. The National Police Service Act (2012) Cap. 84 § 5 (Kenya).
133. See National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 5 (Kenya).
134. Id.
135. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 81
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
136. Interestingly, even in the European Court of Human Rights [ hereinafter ECtHR],
decisions cited by the High Court, the alleged discriminatory measures were predicated
on legislation. In Willis v. United Kingdom, the discriminatory measures were predicated
on the UK Social Security and Benef its Act of 1992. While in Okspisz v. Germany, it was
the Federal Child Benef its Act. See Willis v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36042/974, Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 3 (2002); Okpisz v. Germany, App. No. 59140/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2005).
137. C ONSTITUTION art. 24, § 1(e) (2010) (Kenya).
138. See W ALTER K ÄLIN & J ÖRG K ÜNZLI, T HE L AW OF INTERNATIONAL H UMAN R IGHTS
P ROTECTION 352–53 (2009).
139. See id.; see also Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Use of Language in Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1968); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Comm. No. 983/2001 ¶ 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/983/2001 (2003); Stec v. United
Kingdom, App. Nos. 6573/01 & 65900/01, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, 148 (2006).
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limitation of a right, the measure will not be considered to be necessary, reasonable, and objective and therefore will not be proportionate
and will amount to a violation of the right against discrimination.140
Therefore, even if it were true that women who were pregnant
and their unborn children would be imperiled in the training program (an assertion for which no evidence was adduced in court),141
the state would have been required to show that there were no
reasonable adjustments that could be made in the training program
to accommodate those recruited while pregnant, hence the need to
bar all women who are pregnant from recruitment.
For instance, it is not clear why the Commission could not opt
to recruit women irrespective of pregnancy, as long as they met all
other requirements, including physical and medical requirements,
then allow those who are pregnant to attend training at a later time
after they gave birth. This could be done either by allowing those
pregnant to attend training after giving birth with a later recruitment lot or attend training during special training sessions that
could be designed to be conducted during the usual police promotional training course programs. Indeed this proposal was mooted
in court, but the judge dismissed it offhand as unreasonable and
impractical without any reasons being provided as to how or why
the same was impractical and unreasonable.142
It ought to be noted, reasonable measures need not be convenient to the state, as long as the adjustments can reasonably be made
to avoid limitation of rights.143 In the case of Kenya where generally
social access to employment opportunities has tilted to the detriment of women, owing to the historical unequal power relations
between men and women, it is even more imperative that all reasonable measures be exhausted before actions that once again discriminate against women are allowed.144
From the foregoing therefore, in the author’s view, the court
was wrong in holding that the recruitment exercise did not discriminate against women who were pregnant in violation of Article 27 of
the Constitution. Unfortunately due to the court’s pronouncement,
the subsequent recruitment exercise carried out in 2015 also locked
out women on account of pregnancy.145
140. See Stec, App. Nos. 6573/01 & 65900/01 at 148.
141. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. a paras. 76–81
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
142. See id. at 35.
143. C ONSTITUTION art. 24 (2010) (Kenya).
144. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at 33.
145. See Recruitment of Police Constables, R EPUBLIC OF K ENYA N AT’L P OLICE S ERVICE,
http://www.mygov.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ANNOUNCEMENT-OF-RE
CRUITMENT-OF-POLICE-CONSTABLES-2015.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B8PH-HPNS].
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3. Delegation of Constitutional Powers
This was the key issue before both the High Court and the Court
of Appeal. As noted by the Court of Appeal “[it was] the cudgel that
was used to crush the impugned recruitment.” 146
The gravamen of IPOA’s contention on this issue before the
High Court was that the Commission unlawfully delegated its
powers donated to it under Article 246, Section 3 of the Constitution
to conduct recruitment of police officers to sub-county recruitment
committees, entities unknown in law, and those entities conducted
the entire recruitment exercise.147 IPOA argued that under Article
246, Section 3(a) of the Constitution, the Constitution reserves solely
for the Commission the powers to recruit police officers.148 Section
10(2) as read with Section 10(5) of the NPSC Act allows the Commission to delegate, in writing, the power to recruit police officers
below the rank of superintendent only to the Inspector General of
the National Police Service.149 The Commission, therefore, illegally
in contravention of Article 246, Section 3(a) of the Constitution
delegated its powers to sub-county recruitment committees.150 The
delegation therefore, having been unlawful pursuant to Article 2,
Section 4 of the Constitution, rendered the entire recruitment exercise invalid and a nullity ab initio.151
The Commission, on the other hand, argued that it did not
delegate any powers to the sub-county recruitment committees, and
on the contrary, these were committees of the Commission established pursuant to Section 13 of the NPSC Act.152 The Commission
argued that under Section 13 it is mandated to establish committees
for the better carrying out of its functions.153 It may also co-opt such
persons whose skills and knowledge are necessary for the better
carrying out of such functions.154 The thrust of the Commission’s
argument, therefore, was that there was no delegation of powers,
and on the contrary, the Commission itself conducted the recruitment
exercise through committees of the Commission, of which sub-county
committees were such committees.
146. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at paras. 10, 82
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
150. Id. at para. 93.
151. Id.
152. Id. at paras. 40, 83.
153. Id. at para. 85.
154. Id. at para. 40.
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In its response, IPOA argued that committees of the Commission had to consist of commissioners, who could then co-opt other
persons into the committee.155 Sub-county recruitment committees
did not have any membership from the Commission, and they were
therefore not committees of the Commission à la Section 13 but
entities separate from the Commission and were therefore exercising illegally delegated powers.156
The court concurred with IPOA’s argument.157 It firstly noted
that from the evidence placed before it, the entire recruitment exercise was carried out by the sub-county recruitment committees without any input from the Commission qua Commission.158 Secondly,
the court noted that these committees could not be said to be committees of the Commission as they had no membership from the
Commission.159 The court pointedly posed the question, “when a
Committee has no membership of the NPSC at all, can it be said to
be a Committee of the Commission[?]” 160 The court went on to find
that the committees were in fact exercising illegally delegated powers,
because under Section 10(2) of the NPSC Act, the Commission could
only delegate recruitment to the Inspector General of the National
Police Service.161 In view of that finding, the court held that the
NPSC had acted ultravires in its mandate by delegating recruitment
powers to sub-county recruitment committees. The entire recruitment
exercise was therefore invalid and thus null and void ab initio.162
B. The Case Before the Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal narrowed down on the question of delegation as the key issue on appeal.163 The entire appeal turned on the
legality of the establishment of sub-county recruitment committees.164 Therefore, although IPOA as the first respondent had raised
a cross-appeal on whether the recruitment exercise discriminated
against pregnant women in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution, the question of delegation was the only issue examined by the
155. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 82 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
156. Id. at para. 10.
157. Id. at para. 93.
158. Id. at para. 91.
159. Id. at para. 10.
160. Id. at para. 91.
161. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 93 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
162. Id.
163. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
164. See id.
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court.165 Unfortunately, therefore, the Court of Appeal missed an
opportunity to restate the correct legal position with regards to the
issue of discrimination against pregnant women in the National
Police Service recruitment.
Before the Court of Appeal, the Commission made four substantive arguments against the High Court’s findings on delegation.166
Firstly, it argued that sufficient evidence had not been placed before
the High Court to prove that it had delegated its powers to subcounty recruitment committees.167 In its oral submissions before the
Court of Appeal, the Commission argued that for delegation to exist
there had to be an instrument of delegation; and in this case, the
Commission argued, there was no instrument of delegation exhibited before the court as evidence that the Commission had in fact
delegated its powers.168
Secondly, the Commission reiterated its submission before the
High Court that the sub-county recruitment committees were in fact
committees of the Commission made up of co-opted members and
that the High Court had failed to appreciate the difference between
co-option and delegation.169 This time however, the co-option argument was more nuanced.170 It argued that the Inspector General,
who was a member of the Commission, was actually represented in
the sub-county recruitment committees by dint of the presence of
senior county police officers in the committees.171 Consequently, the
argument went that there was a commissioner of the Commission
represented in the sub-county recruitment committees.172 The subcounty recruitment committees were therefore committees of the
commission under Section 13 of the NPSC Act and its members
were legally co-opted by virtue of that provision.173
Thirdly, the Commission argued, even if the court were to find
the sub-county recruitment committees were not committees of the
Commission, these committees did not carry out the entire recruitment exercise as posited by the learned judge, but merely undertook
certain aspects of the recruitment exercise, which aspects were
merely administrative.174 The thrust of this argument being that the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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recruitment exercise was a process that would end upon the recruits
passing out after training and was not an event that ended upon selection of successful candidates to attend training.175 Consequently,
the Commission argued, there was still a role left to be played by
the Commission qua Commission later before passing out of the
recruits, although it was not clear what exactly that role was.176
The fourth argument by the Commission was a novel argument
not raised before the High Court.177 The Commission argued that
since the Inspector General was a member of the Commission, by
virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution, there was no need for the
Commission to delegate any functions to him since the Inspector
General as a commissioner was already bound by decisions of the
Commission to carry out the recruitment exercise.178
With regard to the first argument, IPOA contended that recruitment guidelines, which were developed by the Commission and
which the Commission had admitted before the High Court, provided the manner in which the exercise was conducted and clearly
showed the recruitment exercise was carried out solely by the subcounty recruitment committees.179
Further averments by participants in the exercise evidently
showed that the exercise was conducted solely by the sub-county
recruitment committees.180 IPOA, therefore, argued there was no
requirement to exhibit an instrument of delegation because whether
there was delegation or not was a matter of fact that was proved by
facts proved in court regarding the manner the exercise was conducted and which facts had been admitted by the Commission.181 On
the second issue, IPOA maintained its argument before the High
Court that committees of the Commission established under Section
13 of the NPSC Act were actually committees made up of Commissioners of the NPSC.182 There was no Commissioner represented in
the sub-county committees, therefore, the committees could not be
committees of the Commission.183 Further, IPOA argued, the recruitment exercise was not a process, but an event that ended when
the successful recruits were issued with docket numbers to attend
175. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
176. Id.
177. Compare discussion of the High Court decision, supra Section III.A, with discussion of the Court of Appeal decision’s novel argument, infra Section III.B.
178. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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training, and all aspects of that event, from document verification
and medical and physical examination to issuance of docket numbers, were done by the sub-county recruitment committees.184 Consequently, the entire recruitment exercise was in fact conducted by
these committees and not the Commission.185
On the question of co-option, IPOA argued, persons could only
be co-opted into previous legally constituted committees, and persons
could not be co-opted to form a committee from scratch.186 Therefore,
IPOA contended, members of the sub-county recruitment committees could not all have been co-opted members as argued by the
Commission.187 Indeed it was contended that if members of the subcounty committees had been co-opted, then pursuant to Section 13
of the NPSC Act, they all did not have powers to vote and make decisions, yet these committees made decisions as to successful candidates to attend training.188
On the fourth argument, IPOA contended, the argument merged
the Office of the Inspector General established under Article 245 of
the Constitution and the Commission established under Article 246.189
It was IPOA’s argument that the Inspector General, as a member of
the Commission, did not have powers not enjoyed by other individual members of the Commission, and recruitment of members of the
National Police Service was a power that reposes in the Commission
as a corporate entity and not on individual members.190 IPOA thus
contended Section 10 of the NPSC Act in acknowledging that distinction allows the NPSC to delegate recruitment of police officers below
the rank of sergeant to the Inspector General as a separate office
from the Commission.191
C. The Court’s Determination
As noted above, the issue of delegation was at the core of the
court’s decision.192 The entire appeal turned on whether the subcounty recruitment committees had been legally constituted.193
While IPOA argued that these committees exercised powers illegally
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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delegated, the Commission argued that they were legally constituted
committees of the Commission.194 The Court of Appeal therefore
dealt at length with the question of what amounts to delegation.195
The court defined delegation as follows:
Delegation is the assignment of responsibility or authority to
another person usually one’s subordinate, or another officer of
a lower rank. It is instructive however that the person delegating must remain fully accountable for the outcome of the delegated work. One can delegate authority but not responsibility.
If a person delegates both authority and responsibility, then this
becomes abdication of duty or denudation of authority and it is
not acceptable.196

The court also noted that where delegation is underpinned by statute, and there is a requirement that delegation must be in writing,
and failure to do such would be null and void.197
The court first noted that powers to conduct recruitment of
police officers was constitutionally reposed on the Commission
under Article 246 of the Constitution.198 However, under Section 10
of the NPSC Act, the Commission was empowered to delegate the
function of recruiting police officers under the rank of sergeant to
the Inspector General but such delegation had to be in writing.199
The court held that from the facts it was clear there was no delegation from the Commission to the Inspector General as required by
the Act, a fact conceded by the appellants in their submission, and
that there was no instrument of delegation.200
On the argument that the sub-county recruitment committees
were committees of the Commission established under Section 13 of
the NPSC Act, the court noted that such committees had to be made
up of commissioners to the Commission.201 Sub-county recruitment
committees had no membership from the Commission.202 On the
argument that members of the sub-county committees were coopted, the court noted that a Committee could not be co-opted from
scratch, but there had to be a legally established committee that
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
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members could be co-opted into.203 Sub-county recruitment committee members thus could not be said to have been co-opted members
of the committee.204
The court further noted that, even assuming arguendo that
power had been legally delegated to the sub-county recruitment
committees, to allow such committees to make the decisions as to
the successful candidates, as was the case in this instance, amounted
to abdication of duty by the Commission and was illegal.205 The court
thus concluded that the sub-county recruitment committees were
exercising illegally delegated authority.206 The court noted from the
facts of the case that it was clear that the entire recruitment exercise was carried out by the sub-county recruitment committees.207
The court thus upheld the High Court’s judgement that the entire
recruitment exercise was null and void ab initio.208
D. Analysis of the Court’s Determination
The court’s determination that sub-county recruitment committees had illegally exercised delegated powers was indeed grounded
on the law and sound legal reasoning.
The rule against illegal delegation draws from the principle in
administrative law that power must be exercised by the entity upon
which it is reposed and by nobody else unless the entity is allowed
by law to delegate power.209 Even where the power reposed upon an
entity is to conduct administrative functions, the courts are rigorous
in ensuring power is exercised by the particular entity upon which
it is reposed and thus do not hesitate to strike out actions by agents
or subcommittees, even where they are expressly authorized by the
entity to act on its behalf, if the entity was not allowed by law to
delegate power.210
In this case, the Commission clearly unlawfully delegated its
powers provided under Article 246, Section 3(a) of the Constitution
to sub-county recruitment committees. The Article provides that
“[t]he Commission shall . . . recruit and appoint persons to hold or
act in offices in the service, confirm appointments, and determine
promotions and transfers within the National Police Service[.]” 211
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
See SIR W ILLIAM W ADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 259 (2009).
Id.
Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
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The power and attendant responsibility to carry out recruitment of persons in the National Police Service clearly repose upon
the Commission and the Commission only. Contrary to the contention by the Commission, sub-county recruitment committees could
not be said to be committees of the Commission co-opted under
Section 13 of the NPSC Act.212 The committees did not have any
membership from the Commission.213 Section 13 of the Act (Committees of the Commission) provides:
(1) The Commission may establish committees for the better
carrying out of its functions.
(2) The Commission may co-opt into the membership of committees established under subsection (1) other persons
whose knowledge and skills are found necessary for the
functions of the Commission.
(3) Any person co-opted into the Commission under subsection
(2) may attend the meetings of the Commission and participate in its deliberation, but shall have no power to vote.214

Firstly, a literal interpretation of the provision shows it refers
to committees made up of commissioners of the Commission. The
provision is titled “Committees of the Commission.” 215 Article 246,
Section 2 of the Constitution sets out who the Commission consists
of.216 This list is exhaustive, and these are the commissioners of the
NPSC.217 Consequently, it logically follows committees of the Commission refers to committees made up of commissioners of the NPSC.
Subsection (2) of Section 13 further buttresses the view that these
committees must be made of commissioners of the NPSC as it provides, “[t]he Commission may co-opt into the membership of committees established under subsection (1) other persons whose knowledge
and skills are found necessary for the functions of the Commission.” 218
The ordinary meaning of the word co-opt as per the Oxford English Dictionary is to “[a]ppoint to membership of a committee or other
body by invitation of the existing members.” 219 Therefore, in order
to co-opt, the person co-opting must himself or herself be a member
of that committee. The provision envisages the committees created
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 13 (Kenya)
(emphasis added).
215. Id.
216. C ONSTITUTION art. 246(2) (2010) (Kenya).
217. Id.
218. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 13(2) (Kenya).
219. Co-opt, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/def inition/english
/co-opt [ https://perma.cc/7GED-2QBU].
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under subsection (1) are made up of commissioners who may then
co-opt other persons with particular expertise into those committees.220
In this case, commissioners of the Commission were not members
of the sub-county recruitment committees, so consequently, they
could not co-opt anyone into the sub-county recruitment committees.221
Subsection (3) finally puts the issue to rest. It provides that “[a]ny
person co-opted into the Commission under subsection (2) may attend the meetings of the Commission and participate in its deliberation, but shall have no power to vote.” 222
If the provision envisaged that the committee could be made up
wholly of co-opted persons, it would be absurd for the provision to
provide, as it does, that persons co-opted could attend meetings of
the Commission but could not vote. Indeed as posed in court, if these
committees could be made up wholly of co-opted members, then how
could its members make decisions and yet the provision clearly
saves decision-making powers only to commissioners of the Commission and not co-opted members?223
It is thus clear from the foregoing that sub-county recruitment
committees were entities separate from the Commission. The recruitment exercise was carried out by these entities based on illegal delegation of powers, and the exercise was thus null and void ab initio.224
The courts were, therefore, correct in nullifying the entire exercise.
That said, however, there is an important question on delegation
of constitutional powers that the courts did not address that has significant impact on the conduct of subsequent recruitment exercises.225
Both litigants and the Court appeared to assume that, pursuant
to Section 10 of the NPSC Act, the Commission could lawfully delegate the exercise of recruitment of police officers above the rank of
superintendent to the Inspector General of the National Police Service.226 There was no analysis by the courts as to whether provisions
220. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya); see
also Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 87 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
221. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
222. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 13(3) (Kenya).
223. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
224. Id.
225. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 6 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya) (relating to the Petitioner’s reference to the authorities of Article 246, Section 3 of
the 2010 Kenya Constitution and Section 10 of the National Police Service Commission
Act, both of which govern delegation of recruitment power).
226. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.)
(Kenya); see also Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para.
91 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
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of Section 10 of the NPSC Act that allow the Commission to delegate
power to conduct recruitment of members of the NPS to the Inspector General are in tandem with Article 246 of the Constitution that
reposes that power solely upon the Commission.227
As afore stated, the rule against illegal delegation draws from
the principle in administrative law that power must be exercised by
the entity upon which it is reposed and nobody else, unless where
the entity is allowed by law to delegate power.228 This principle
applies even more forcefully where powers to be exercised are constitutionally reposed. Constitutional powers must be exercised by
the entities upon which the Constitution reposes such powers, unless
where the Constitution itself allows the entity to delegate such
powers.229 This is so because in democracies with written constitutions, the written constitution is supreme unlike states, such as the
United Kingdom, where the constitution is unwritten and therefore
the legislature and legislative acts are supreme.230
In fact, Article 2 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution declares its
own supremacy, which extends not only over legislation but also
over all state organs, including the legislature.231 Further, this
supremacy is unimpeachable pursuant to Article 2, Section 3.232 The
Constitution also allocates powers to various state organs.233 This
allocation of powers is not limited to the traditional three arms of
government but also includes Constitutional Commissions created
by the Constitution.234 The Constitution, therefore, being supreme
and its supremacy being unimpeachable means allocation of powers
by the Constitution cannot be tampered with even by the legislature, unless via amendment to the Constitution.235 Consequently,
227. To be fair to the courts, the parties also did not raise the issue at the High Court
or at the Court of Appeal. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R.
at paras. 6, 10–13 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). However, this being a matter of law that went to the
core of a key issue in the petition, the courts could have raised the matter suo motu and
then invited parties to submit on the same and thereafter make a determination. For a
detailed explication on the court acting suo motu or sua sponte, see Republic v. Public
Procurement Administrative Review Board (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 57 (H.C.K.) (Kenya),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/103617 [ https://perma.cc/JJ3W-H23H]; see
also Henry Njagi Muruariua v. A.O. Okello (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 13 (C.A.K.) (Kenya),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/104669 [ https://perma.cc/GUS4-KZBQ].
228. See W ADE & F ORSYTH, supra note 209, at 159.
229. See, e.g., U.S. C ONST. art. 1, § 1.
230. See M ORRIS K. M BONDENYI & J OHN O SOGO A MBANI, T HE N EW C ONSTITUTIONAL
L AW OF K ENYA: P RINCIPLES, G OVERNMENT AND H UMAN R IGHTS 18–19 (2012).
231. C ONSTITUTION art. 2 (2010) (Kenya).
232. Id. at art. 2(3).
233. Id. at art. 1(3).
234. Id. at arts. 248–254.
235. See id. at art 249(2) (providing that constitutional commissions are subject only to
the Constitution and the law and are not subject to the control by any person or authority).
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where the Constitution reposes certain powers on a commission, the
legislature cannot via legislation divest such powers from the said
Commission and vest them in another entity.236 Likewise, it cannot
via legislation allow the Commission to delegate its Constitutional
powers to another entity, unless where the Constitution itself envisages that the powers can be delegated.237
Therefore, where the Constitution reposes certain powers on an
entity in determining whether such powers can be delegated, the
analysis must begin with the Constitution itself, whether the Constitution intended such powers to be delegable and if so to which
entity and by what process. Consequently, the court in the recruitment case ought to have examined whether the powers reposed upon
the Commission under Article 246 of the Constitution were in the
first place intended by the Constitution to be delegable as provided
for in section 10 of the NPSC Act.
Article 246, Section 3(a) of the Constitution with regard to functions of the NPSC provides that “[t]he Commission shall . . . recruit
and appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the service, confirm
appointments, and determine promotions and transfers within the
National Police Service[.]” 238 The provision uses the word “shall.” 239
Therefore, from the text of the provision, the Commission itself is
mandatorily required to carry out those functions set out, and therefore, concomitantly, only the Commission may exercise powers necessary to carry out those tasks. Subsection 246, Section 3(c) only
allows the legislature to prescribe additional functions to the Commission, and it does not allow it to vest functions already prescribed
in the Constitution to the Commission to another entity or allow the
Commission to delegate those functions.240
This provision can be contrasted with the prosecutorial powers
granted to the Director of Public Prosecutions under Article 157.241
After setting out the powers of the Director of Public prosecution in
subparagraphs 6–8, subparagraph 9 of the Constitution provides
that “[t]he powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions may be
exercised in person or by subordinate officers acting in accordance
with general or special instructions.” 242 The provision, unlike in the
236. Id. at art. 2.
237. C ONSTITUTION arts. 249, 252 (2010) (Kenya).
238. Id. at art. 246(3).
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at art. 246(3)(c) (stating that the police may only do what is prescribed by national legislation).
241. Id. at art. 157.
242. Id. at art. 157(9).
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case of the Commission, envisages that the powers may be delegated
to subordinate officers.
The provision may also be contrasted with Article 234 of the
Constitution that sets out the powers and functions of the Public
Service Commission.243 Article 234, Section 5 provides that “[t]he
Commission may delegate, in writing, with or without conditions,
any of its functions and powers under this Article to any one or more
of its members, or to any officer, body or authority in the public
service.” 244 The Constitution, therefore, envisages that the Public
Service Commission may delegate its powers to conduct its functions
to other entities.
From a purely textual interpretation of Article 246, unlike in
the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Public Service
Commission, it is clear the provision does not envisage delegation
of the functions placed upon the Commission by the Constitution to
any entity, including the Inspector General. However, as noted by
the Supreme Court, a holistic interpretation of the Constitution also
requires an analysis of the rationale and history behind that provision of the Constitution.245
As stated above, the establishment of the NPSC in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 was borne out of a process aimed at reforming
and professionalizing the National Police Service.246 The aim of
which was to do away with the culture of political manipulation and
control of the police by the executive by insulating the police from
such control and by creating an independent constitutional commission vested with certain powers, including powers to recruit police
officers.247 As afore stated, one of the ways in which executive manipulation and control over the police was manifested was in the
recruitment of police officers.248 Pursuant to Article 108 of the old
constitution, the Commissioner of Police, an appointee of the President, was vested with powers to recruit police officers below the
243. C ONSTITUTION art. 234 (2010) (Kenya).
244. Id. at art. 234(5).
245. In re Kenya Nat’l Comm’n on Human Rights (2014) eK.L.R. (S.C.K.) (Kenya),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/94849 [ https://perma.cc/969M-KJB8].
But what is meant by a ‘holistic interpretation of the Constitution’[?] It
must mean interpreting the Constitution in context. It is the contextual
analysis of a constitutional provision, reading it alongside and against other
provisions, so as to maintain a rational explication of what the Constitution
must be taken to mean in light of its history, of the issues in dispute, and
of the prevailing circumstances.
246. R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 25, 27 (regarding emphasis on police reforms
in multiple drafts of Kenya’s Constitution, functions of the police service commission,
and public skepticism of police reform initiatives).
247. See id. at 15–16, 18–19, 45.
248. See id.
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rank of Assistant Inspector of Police.249 Furthermore, the Public
Service Commission, which was vested with powers to recruit officers above the rank of Assistant Inspector of Police, was allowed
under that Constitution to delegate all its powers, including its
reserved recruitment powers to the Commissioner of Police.250
Consequently, the Commissioner of Police ended up with all
recruitment powers.251 The Commissioner in turn delegated such
powers to other officers who exercised these powers with wanton
disregard for any ethical standards and showed a complete obeisance to executive orders from “above” on who to recruit.252 Consequently, recruitment exercises of members of the police became
synonymous with unethical practices, tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and other malpractice being the popular bywords descriptive
of these processes.253 The process of reform of the police was thus to
begin with the manner of recruitment of police officers.254 Consequently, one of the major functions of the Commission was to carry
out recruitment of members of the National Police Service.255 Ergo,
recruitment powers were to be entirely removed from the Commissioner of Police and vested on the NPSC.256
That being the case, while Article 245 of the Constitution created
the office of the Inspector General to exercise independent command
over the National Police Service, with the Inspector General, like in
the repealed constitution, being appointed by the President (albeit
this time with parliamentary approval), the powers to carry out
recruitment of members of the service were vested solely in the
National Police Service Commission created under Article 246 of the
Constitution.257 Vesting of recruitment powers on the NPSC and not
the Inspector General was thus not a fluke by the drafters of the
Constitution, but a purposive choice by Kenyans drawn from the
history of the police in Kenya and the urgent need to reform it.
The legislature through the NPSC Act, however, remarkably
draws away from this grain.258 Section 10 of the NPSC Act, in allowing
the Commission to once again delegate recruitment of police officers
See C ONSTITUTION art. 108 (2009) (Kenya) (repealed).
See id. at art. 108(2)( b)(i).
Id.
See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 19, 45.
See id. at 102, 215–17.
See id. at 11, 97–98.
The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA GAZETTE S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 3(1); see The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C
§ 10 (Kenya).
256. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 48.
257. C ONSTITUTION arts. 245, 246(3)(a) (2010) (Kenya).
258. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 10(2)–(3) (Kenya).
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
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below a certain cadre to the Inspector General, goes contrary to the
requirement that recruitment of police officers is conducted by the
Commission.259 Section 10 of the NPSC Act thus goes contrary not
only to the letter, but also the spirit of Article 246 of the Constitution.
The question that then naturally follows is how can a ninemember Commission carry out recruitment of 10,000 police officers?
And indeed, the gravamen of some of the submissions by the Commission in court were based on the argument that the Commission
had to delegate recruitment due to the large number of recruits
expected.260 Therefore, the argument went, the Constitution must
have envisaged delegation of such recruitment powers.261 Despite
this being a circular argument, it may resonate with some proponents of delegation. The answer, however, lies in the manner of
recruitment. As above-noted, the Ransley Report proposals on the
reform of the recruitment of police officers were not limited to just
the entity that would conduct the recruitment but also how the
exercise was to be carried out.262 The report recommended the doing
away with conduct of recruitment exercise as a one-day event.263
Instead, recruitment was to be conducted as a process that would be
carried out in stages.264 This would enable the recruiting agency to
sufficiently vet and scrutinize those joining the service, thus ensuring only highly qualified persons joined the police.265 The report,
therefore, recommended that the recruitment exercise be a three
stage process that included written applications, oral interviews, and
vetting by the Commission.266 Such a phased recruitment exercise
enables the Commission to be intimately and directly involved in
the recruitment exercise—even where the numbers being recruited
are large—without delegating. Therefore, it is very much possible and
in accordance with the law for the Commission to conduct recruitment of police officers without delegating to the Inspector General.
Section 10 of the NPSC Act that allows delegation of recruitment powers to the Inspector General therefore reverts back to the
position prior to police reforms.267 Moreover, it is both unnecessary
and unconstitutional.
259. Id.
260. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 92 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
261. Id. at para. 93.
262. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 109–10.
263. Id. at 101, 103, 110.
264. See id. at 109–10.
265. Id. at 107–10.
266. Id. at 109–10.
267. The National Police Service Commission Act (2012) Cap. 185C § 10(2) (Kenya);
see R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 45.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE RECRUITMENT DECISIONS ON REFORMS IN
RECRUITMENT OF POLICE OFFICERS
A. Transparency and Accountability in the Recruitment Process
As discussed above, the recruitment petition explored questions
of transparency, accountability, and public participation in the recruitment exercise.268 It was contended and upheld by the court that
in order to ensure such transparency and accountability, it was
imperative that there are regulations available to the public to guide
the process and which would provide clear procedures and standards
upon which the exercise could be audited.269 As noted above, at the
time of conducting the recruitment exercise in 2014, there were no
gazetted regulations guiding the conduct of the recruitment exercise,
and further, the skeleton guidelines given to sub-county recruitment
committees by the Commission to guide the exercise were never
made public.270
One of the commendable outcomes of the petition was the development and gazzettement of the recruitment regulations of 2015.271
These regulations were gazetted after the High Court decision and
sought to address, inter alia, issues raised in the High Court regarding transparency of the recruitment process.272 The regulations now
clearly provide the procedure for carrying out a recruitment exercise
in stages (at least where the same is conducted by the Commission),
as envisaged in the Ransley Report.273 The first stage of the exercise
entails written applications to the Commission, where the Commission itself short-lists candidates to attend the second stage.274 The
second stage entails physical and medical evaluation, where shortlisted candidates attend evaluation which are to be carried out by
recruitment panels in accordance with guidelines and manuals issued
by the Commission.275 The panels are then expected to short-list the
successful candidates, if possible twice the number required to go to
the third stage.276 In the third and final stage, the Commission then
268. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at paras. 11–16, 56–
59 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
269. Id. at paras. 57, 58, 65–68.
270. Id. at paras. 64–67.
271. See The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE
S UPPLEMENT No. 39.
272. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
273. The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE
S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 12.
274. Id. §§ 11–12.
275. Id. §§ 13–14.
276. Id. § 14.
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selects the final lists of successful candidates from the list provided
by the recruitment panels.277
That being said, however, one of the main concerns impeaching
the transparency and accountability of the recruitment exercise carried out in 2014 was the lack of clear guidelines that set out the
required physical and medical standards for eligibility for recruitment.278 The lack of clear standards provided a lacunae for sub-county
recruitment committees to exercise a lot of discretion in disqualifying candidates.279 This wide, unchecked discretion therefore opened
avenues for corruption by sub-county committees, where persons
were disqualified for flimsy reasons such as having brown teeth.280
The current recruitment regulations seek to cure this problem by
providing for the development of a manual to set physical and medical
standards to be used in recruitment exercises.281 However, to date, no
manual has yet been developed to set these important standards.282
B. Discrimination Against Women on Account of Pregnancy
As above discussed, while the High Court upheld discrimination
against women in the recruitment exercise on account of pregnancy,283
in the author’s view, the court erred in its analysis and conclusion
drawn therefrom. The recruitment regulations of 2015, however, do
not specifically provide for pregnancy as a ground for disqualification from recruitment.284 As noted above, the manual to set physical
and medical standards is yet to be developed.285 It is hoped that in
the development of the manual, a different position will be adopted
by the Commission in regards to disqualification on account of pregnancy. Indeed, as discussed above, in the author’s view, it is possible
to accommodate recruitment of women who are pregnant.
Id. § 15.
Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at paras. 64–65.
Id. at 13.
Id.
The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 14(8)–(9).
282. See INDEP. P OLICING O VERSIGHT A UTHORITY, IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT ON THE
R ECRUITMENT OF P OLICE C ONSTABLES (2015), http://www.ipoa.go.ke/downloads/images
/press/IPOAPoliceRecruitmentMonitoringReport2015.pdf (discussing how no one knew
what the regulations were at the 2015 exercise which indicates there were no guideline
manuals) [ hereinafter IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT].
283. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 81 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya).
284. The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 3(1).
285. See IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT, supra note 282.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
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C. Delegation of Constitutional Powers
As discussed above, delegation of constitutional powers became
the key issue in the case both before the High Court and on appeal
before the Court of Appeal.286 Furthermore, as discussed above, in
the author’s view, it is possible for the Commission to carry out a
recruitment exercise without necessarily having to delegate recruitment powers to sub-county recruitment committees or the Inspector
General of Police. The key to which is a recruitment exercise carried
out in stages. As noted above, the current recruitment regulations
reflect this idea of a phased recruitment exercise carried out in
three stages, where the Commission is intimately involved in the
exercise instead of simply delegating the entire exercise to recruitment panels.287 However, the second stage of the exercise (physical
and medical evaluations) still entails delegation of power by the
Commission to the recruitment panels since the panels are expected
to determine the successful candidates at that stage.288 As discussed
above, delegation of power entails delegating decision-making
powers vested by law to one entity to another entity.289 Delegation
of powers even with regard to administrative tasks is illegal where
the same is not provided for in law.290 In the author’s view, it would
have been more in tandem with legal principles regarding delegation
of power had the regulations provided for the recruitment panels to
simply carry out physical and medical evaluation in terms of guidelines issued by the Commission and simply to provide data to the
Commission on how each candidate faired.291 The Commission could
then select successful candidates based on the data provided. Decision making powers would, therefore, remain entirely with the
Commission and the recruitment panels would not make any decision as to successful candidates at any stage. This would also avoid
the current lacunae in the regulations where it is not clear what criteria the Commission will use in selecting the final list of successful
candidates from the short list provided by the recruiting panels.292
286. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya);
Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para.82 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
287. Compare R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 109–10 with The National Police
Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 39 § 10 (Kenya).
288. The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE
S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 12 (Kenya).
289. See W ADE & F ORSYTH, supra note 209, at 29.
290. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2014) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
291. See id. (“The committees could only vet and verify documentation, conduct the
physical and medical examination, and then forward the documents and results to the
Commission. . . .” ).
292. As per regulation 12(14), the recruitment panels during the second stage are
required to short-list at least twice the number required to get to the third stage. See
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That said, the regulations are a marked improvement from the
erstwhile scenario, where the recruitment subcommittees carried
out the entire recruitment process, from receiving written applications to selecting the final successful candidates. The Commission
in this case makes the ultimate decision as to the successful candidates to attend training.293
However, the regulations, still drawing from Section 10 of the
NPSC Act, reserve for the Commission the power to delegate recruitment of officers below a certain cadre to the Inspector General,
and in that case, the Inspector General would be accountable for the
recruitment exercise.294 As afore stated, such a recruitment exercise
would fall afoul of Article 246 of the Constitution that does not
envisage delegation of recruitment powers by the Commission to the
Inspector General.295
The regulations therefore provide a choice in the manner of conduct of recruitment: the first one, the manner envisaged in the new
constitutional dispensation, seeks to engender police reforms through
a new recruitment process carried out in stages by the Commission,
or the second one, which entails a return to the old recruitment process carried out as a one-day event by the Inspector General.296
The police recruitment exercise in 2015 provided the perfect
opportunity where the Commission was required to elect between
the two processes and select which process would be used to conduct
a repeat recruitment exercise.297
V. POLICE RECRUITMENT EXERCISES IN 2015, 2016, AND 2017:
A CASE OF THERE AND BACK AGAIN
A. Recruitment Exercise in 2015
In April 2015, the Commission advertised for a fresh recruitment exercise for police officers.298 The exercise was meant to recruit
10,000 police officers, and was therefore once again, meant to be the
largest police recruitment exercise in the country’s history following
The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2011) K ENYA GAZETTE S UPPLEMENT
No. 39 § 12(14) (Kenya). See id. §§ 12(4)–(9).
293. See id. §§ 12(15)–(16).
294. See id. §§ 3(2)–(4).
295. See Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
296. See The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA G AZETTE
S UPPLEMENT No. 39 §§ 12(8)–(13) (stating there are two phases and that the second
phase will be on “the” date, which indicates one day).
297. Att’y Gen. v. Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. (2015) eK.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
298. Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 145.
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the nullified 2014 process.299 The exercise also provided an opportunity for the Commission to implement reforms in police recruitment
drawing from the High Court decision in the recruitment petition and
now articulated (albeit not perfectly) in the recruitment regulations.300
Unfortunately however, the manner of conduct of the exercise
simply mirrored recruitment exercises in the bygone era prior to
police reforms.301
Firstly, conduct of the exercise was delegated to the Inspector
General.302 The Inspector General in turn delegated conduct of the
exercise in various recruitment centres to his subordinate officers.303
Therefore, in effect, the exercise mirrored the recruitment process
prior to the current constitutional framework and envisaged police
reforms that seek to insulate police recruitment from executive manipulation by removing recruitment powers from the Commissioner of
Police and vesting them on an independent constitutional commission.
Secondly, the entire recruitment exercise was conducted as a
one-day event instead of a phased recruitment exercise envisaged
in the recruitment regulations.304 As afore discussed, one of the key
areas highlighted for reform in the Ransley Report regarding the
manner of conduct of police recruitment was conduct of the exercise
as a one-day event.305 This practice afforded avenues for unethical
practices and corruption during the exercise due to the little opportunity afforded for oversight, handling of complaints, and audit of
the exercise.306 Additionally, in a one-day event, it was doubtful
whether the recruiters could actually sufficiently gauge the quality
of the recruits.307 The High Court also alluded to this issue, noting
that the NPSC could adopt a policy similar to the Kenya Defense
forces, where recruitment is carried out over a period of time as opposed to a one-day event.308 Consequently, by reverting back to
299. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 1 (H.C.K.)
(Kenya); Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 145.
300. Compare Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 128
(H.C.K.) (Kenya) with The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) K ENYA
G AZETTE S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 5 (Kenya).
301. IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT, supra note 282, at 8–13.
302. See Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 145.
303. The recruitment exercise was conducted by senior police off icers at the police divisional level with the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service having
different team leaders. See id. at 8–9.
304. See id. at 10–11.
305. See R ANSLEY R EPORT, supra note 19, at 103.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 92
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).

164

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 24:127

recruitment as a one-day event, the Commission further whittled
down gains made in reforming the recruitment of police officers.
Thirdly, the recruitment exercise was conducted without development of the manual envisaged in the regulations, setting objective
physical and medical standards to guide physical and medical evaluations during recruitment.309 Consequently, once again, the recruiters were left with wide discretion to determine what physical and
medical requirements were to be applied in the various recruitment
centres.310 As afore discussed, this then opens avenues for candidates to be disqualified on flimsy physical and medical grounds, and
therefore, impeaches the transparency and accountability of the
entire recruitment exercise.311
Lastly, the practice of barring pregnant women from recruitment continued, undoubtedly buoyed by the High Court’s decision
on the issue, despite the fact that the regulations do not specifically
identify pregnancy as a ground for disqualification.312
Consequently, therefore, by failing to take into account the key
areas of reforms articulated in the High Court’s decision and capitalizing on the weaknesses of the decision, the Commission was able to
conduct an exercise that simply replicated recruitment exercises prior
to police reforms. It was, therefore, a case of there and back again.
B. Subsequent Recruitment Exercises in 2016 and 2017
Unfortunately, the subsequent recruitment exercises carried
out in 2016, and more recently in 2017, have mirrored the exercise
carried out in 2015 on all aspects.313 Both of these recruitment
exercises were carried out by the Inspector General on the basis of
delegated authority from the Commission.314 The exercises were also
309. Id. at para. 13; see also IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT, supra note 282, at 11–13.
310. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 13
(H.C.K.) (Kenya); see also IPOA M ONITORING R EPORT, supra note 282, at 11–13.
311. See Indep. Policing Oversight Auth. v. Att’y Gen. (2014) eK.L.R. at para. 13
(H.C.K.) (Kenya).
312. The advertisement for recruitment clearly stipulated that female candidates were
not to be pregnant at the time of recruitment or during subsequent training. See Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 145.
313. Recruitment of Police Constables, R EPUBLIC OF K ENYA N AT’L P OLICE S ERV.,
http://www.npsc.go.ke/index.php/2014-03-25-12-08-21/downloads [ https://perma.cc/4PAL
-A64D]; see also K ENYA N ATIONAL C OMMISSION ON H UMAN R IGHTS, DISS ERVICE TO THE
S ERVICE: R EPORT OF THE M ONITORING OF THE 2016 R ECRUITMENT OF P OLICE C ONSTABLES
TO THE NPS (2016), http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/disService
%20%20to%20the%20Service.pdf?ver=2016-08-24-100042-787 [ https://perma.cc/Z3UU
-SEHU] [ hereinafter DISSERVICE TO THE S ERVICE].
314. See DISS ERVICE TO THE S ERVICE, supra note 313.
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conducted as one-day events, instead of phased recruitment exercises.315 Additionally, the manual setting objective physical and
medical standards was not used as it is yet to be developed.316 Lastly,
the practice of barring women from recruitment has persisted.317
This manner of conducting recruitment now appears to be the favored mode, which is an unfortunate return to the old recruitment
process carried out as a one-day event by the Inspector General.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, the petition had significant impact on the
reform of National Police Service recruitment exercises. Apart from
sending an unequivocal message that recruitment of police officers
must be carried out in strict accord with certain constitutional principles postulated, it catalyzed the development of regulations that
seek to effect key aspects of these constitutional principles highlighted in the recruitment decisions. The regulations, however, are
far from perfect, and there are certain key aspects that still require
further work. For instance, development of the manual setting out
standards to be used in evaluating physical and medical requirements is crucial to engender transparency and accountability in the
recruitment process.
That said, however, the Courts’ decisions on certain aspects of
recruitment may also negatively impact envisaged reforms. The High
Court’s position regarding disqualification of women on grounds of
pregnancy may further entrench this discriminatory practice in subsequent recruitment exercises as evidenced in the recruitment exercises carried out in 2015, 2016, and 2017.318 While it is unfortunate
that the Court of Appeal failed to take advantage of the opportunity
to settle the issue, the same can still be addressed in the development of the manual. It can be set out in the regulations by specifically
highlighting that pregnancy is not a ground for disqualification.
315. See KENYA N AT’L C OMM’N ON H UMAN R IGHTS, A LMOST THERE: T HE JOURNEY TO
ACTUALIZING PROFESSIONAL POLICE RECRUITMENT, http://knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Exit
%20Report-Monitoring%20the%20Recruitment%20of%20Police%20Constables%202017
.pdf?ver=2017-05-12-134035-513 [ https://perma.cc/GR8W-W3M9] [ hereinafter A LMOST
THERE]; see also DISS ERVICE TO THE S ERVICE, supra note 313, at 8; Muthoni Waweru,
Hiring of 10,000 police off icers kicks off on April 4, C APITAL N EWS ( Mar. 22, 2016),
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2016/03/hiring-10000-police-off icers-kicks-off-april-4
[ https://perma.cc/F8X5-DYHT].
316. See A LMOST THERE, supra note 315, at para. 5.
317. See id. at paras. 19–20.
318. See DISS ERVICE TO THE S ERVICE, supra note 313; Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 145; Recruitment of Police Constables, supra note 313.
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Further and critically, the High Court and the Court of Appeal’s
failure to evaluate the constitutionality of Section 10 of the NPSC
Act that allows delegation of recruitment powers has now entrenched the practice of delegating recruitment of police officers to
the Inspector General, as is reflected in the current recruitment
regulations.319 This in effect emasculates the intended constitutional
reforms that seek to insulate police recruitment from executive
manipulation by removing recruitment powers from the Commissioner of Police and vesting them in an independent constitutional
commission. There is an urgent need for the legislature to reconsider Section 10 of the NPSC Act and repeal that provision that
allows the Commission to delegate recruitment powers to the Inspector General. In the alternative, stakeholders in the police reforms sector, including IPOA, may file a constitutional petition
challenging the constitutionality of that provision that now threatens to render stillborn reforms in police recruitment.
Finally, if an example were needed as to how perilously close we
are to rolling back any gains made in police recruitment reforms,
the manner of conduct of the recruitment exercises carried out in
2015, 2016, and 2017 provides the unequivocal warning that we are
teetering on the edge. It also brings to the forefront the urgent need
to quickly address the above highlighted areas of concern, and if not,
any gains made in reform of police recruitment are simply going to
be a case of there and then back again.

319. The National Police Service Commission Act, No. 30 (2015) KENYA G AZETTE
S UPPLEMENT No. 39 § 3 (Kenya).

